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____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Vanessa Budhun appeals the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to her employer, The Reading Hospital 
and Medical Center (“Reading”) on her Family Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2691, et seq., 
interference and retaliation claims.  She also appeals the 
District Court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her 
complaint to add a claim for violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of the 
District Court with respect to her FMLA claims and affirm 
the District Court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend 
her complaint. 
 
I. 
 
 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise 
noted.  In 2008, Budhun was hired by Berkshire Health 
Partners (“BHP”), an affiliate of Reading, as a credentialing 
assistant.  The written job description for this position 
required her to generate and maintain records, and to 
demonstrate “efficiency and accuracy in the credentialing” of 
network healthcare providers.  Appendix (“App.”) 140.  The 
written job description noted that the job required preparing 
and mailing credentialing packets, processing and verifying 
credentialing information, performing data entry, scanning, 
and similar tasks.  App. 140-43.  Budhun estimated that 
approximately sixty percent of her job was typing, a figure 
Reading does not contest.  App. 82.  Budhun’s direct 
supervisor was Sherri Alvarez; Alvarez reported to the 
director of the credentialing department, Dawn Dreibelbis. 
 
 In accordance with applicable law, Reading provides 
its employees with up to twelve weeks of job-protected 
FMLA leave during any rolling twelve-month period.  
Reading requires employees to submit a leave certification 
from a healthcare professional prior to approving any FMLA 
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leave.  App. 155.  It also requires employees to submit a 
“fitness-for-duty” certification in the form of a return to work 
form that confirms that the employee can work “without 
restriction” before returning.  App. 159.  If an employee does 
not contact Reading’s human resources department at the end 
of his or her leave, Reading’s policy states that it will 
consider the employee to have voluntarily resigned.  Id.   
 
Reading also has a transfer policy which prohibits 
employees who have been disciplined by a final written 
warning in the last year from transferring to another position 
within Reading.  App. 151.  As is pertinent to this appeal, 
Budhun received a final written warning on January 25, 2010 
for tardiness. 
 
Prior to taking the FMLA leave that is the subject of 
this suit, Budhun took approximately four weeks of FMLA 
leave in two separate segments between March 31, 2010 and 
May 7, 2010.  During this period of time, Ann Rushow, an 
employee from a different department, filled in for Budhun 
part of the time.  Rushow remained in this part-time role upon 
Budhun’s return. 
 
Budhun broke her fifth metacarpal, the bone in her 
hand connecting her wrist to her pinky finger, on July 30, 
2010 in an incident unrelated to her job.  She arrived at work 
on Monday, August 2, 2010 with a metal splint on her right 
hand.  At 10:33 a.m. that day, she received an email from 
Stacey Spinka, a Reading human resources employee, stating 
“Your supervisor has made us aware that you have an injury 
that prevents you from working full duty,” and providing 
Budhun with FMLA leave forms.  App. 244.  Budhun 
apparently then left work and saw a physician assistant at 
OAA Orthopedic Specialists that same day.  App. 253.   
 
Budhun returned to OAA and saw Dr. Richard Battista 
on August 3 and August 10, 2010.  Dr. Battista taped the 
pinky, ring, and middle fingers on her right hand together to 
stabilize her pinky finger.  According to Budhun, she asked 
Dr. Battista to fill out the FMLA leave certification form.  
She told Dr. Battista that her job required typing, and that she 
felt she could type with the five fingers on her left hand, and 
her thumb and index finger on her right hand.  App. 315.   
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On August 12, 2010, Budhun emailed Spinka some of 
the FMLA paperwork that she had been provided.  App. 429.  
Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that 
Budhun attached to her email a portion of the hospital’s leave 
of absence form and a note from her doctor.  The note was 
dated August 10, 2010 and provided that she could return to 
work on Monday, August 16, 2010, stating, “No restrictions 
in splint.”  In her email, Budhun clearly stated that she was 
going to return on Monday. 
 
Budhun returned to her place of work at BHP as 
promised on August 16, 2010.  At 11:06 a.m., Budhun 
emailed Spinka again, attaching the other portion of the 
hospital’s leave of absence form.  App. 431.  This form stated 
an expected return to work date of August 16, 2010.  App. 
263.  Budhun stated that she provided the FMLA leave 
certification to Dr. Battista on August 3, and that he said it 
would take ten to fifteen days to complete.  Also attached to 
this email was a form giving Reading authorization to contact 
Budhun’s medical providers should it need to clarify any of 
the information that Budhun provided.  App. 265.   
 
In this email, Budhun stated that she still had a splint 
on her right hand, but that she could “type slowly and write a 
little bit, but not as fast as I used to. . . . I could work but not 
fast.”  App. 431.  Spinka replied at 11:25 a.m., informing 
Budhun that because her return to work note “states ‘no 
restrictions’, therefore you should be at full duty (full speed) 
in your tasks.  If you are unable to do so, you should contact 
your physician and ask him to write you and [sic.] excuse to 
stay out of work until you may do so.”  Id.  Budhun 
responded six minutes later, stating that she could “use my 
index and thumb finger of that [right] hand so I can’t go at 
full speed, but I could work.”  App. 430.  Spinka again 
replied and informed Budhun that she needed to perform at 
the “same capacity” as she did prior to going on leave and 
that she should have full use of all her digits in order to be 
considered full duty.  Id.  “It seems that your physician was 
incorrect in stating that you could work unrestricted.  If you 
were truly unrestricted in your abilities, you would have full 
use of all your digits.”  Id.  The record does not indicate 
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whether this was the last conversation between Budhun and 
Spinka or anybody else at the hospital that morning. 
 
What is clear is that Budhun, under the impression that 
Reading would not permit her to work with three fingers in 
her right hand incapacitated, then left her place of work and 
went back to Dr. Battista’s office.  At 1:34 p.m. on that same 
day, August 16, Dr. Battista’s office faxed Budhun’s 
completed FMLA leave certification form to Reading.  App. 
271.  In it, Dr. Battista checked “yes” next to the question 
asking whether Budhun was unable to perform “any of his/her 
job functions.”  App. 272.  In the field below this question, 
which asked which job functions Budhun could not perform, 
Dr. Battista simply wrote “out of work until 08/16/10.”  Id.  
On the next page, Dr. Battista estimated the period of 
incapacity as “08/02/10-08/16/10.”  App. 273.  Dr. Battista 
signed and dated the FMLA leave certification form on that 
same day, August 16, 2010.   
 
The final page in Dr. Battista’s fax was, however, 
somewhat inconsistent with all of the information he had 
previously given.  The last page consisted of a one line note, 
stating, “[p]lease excuse patient from work until reevaluation 
on 9/8/2010.”  App. 275.  This note was signed and dated 
August 16, 2010 as well.  The next day, Reading approved 
FMLA leave for Budhun from August 2, 2010 through 
September 8, 2010.  App. 276. 
 
Budhun remained out of work on FMLA leave.  Dr. 
Battista evaluated her again on September 8, 2010, prescribed 
occupational therapy for her hand, and scheduled a follow-up 
appointment for November 9, 2010.  Budhun emailed Spinka 
and Alvarez that day, informing them that the doctor would 
release her to work as soon as she could move her fingers 
without problems.  App. 340.  Spinka responded that because 
Budhun’s approved FMLA leave expired on September 8, 
Reading would need a note from Budhun’s doctor.  Budhun 
faxed Spinka a note dated September 10, 2010, in which Dr. 
Battista stated that Budhun would be out of work until her 
next doctor’s appointment in November.  App. 280.  Spinka 
then extended Budhun’s FMLA leave until September 23, 
2010 (the date at which her twelve weeks of allotted FMLA 
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leave was exhausted), and approved non-FMLA leave 
through November 9, 2010.  App. 287-88. 
 
Budhun emailed Spinka again on September 13, 
informing her that the “doctor” had informed her that he 
would release her to work prior to November if she felt better.  
App. 283.  In this email, she stated that she thought she would 
be able to work by the end of the month.  Id.  Budhun 
attended several more occupational therapy sessions 
throughout the remainder of September. 
 
On September 15, 2010, Alvarez, Dreibelbis, Spinka, 
Chuck Wills, the President and CEO of BHP, and Gretchen 
Shollenberger, the director of human resources, had a 
meeting.  According to Alvarez, the purpose of the meeting 
was to discuss what BHP would do if Budhun did not return 
from leave by September 23, 2010.  The meeting participants 
agreed that if Budhun did not return to work by that date, they 
would offer Budhun’s job to Rushow.  App. 394, 405.  When 
Budhun did not return by the end of her FMLA leave, BHP 
offered the position to Rushow on September 25, 2010.  
Rushow accepted. 
 
After replacing Budhun, Dreibelbis and Alvarez 
attempted to contact her on September 27 and 28 but were 
unable to reach her.  On September 29, Budhun emailed them 
and informed them that she would be able to secure a return 
to work note the following day, and be able to return to work 
on October 4, 2010.  App. 329.  Alvarez and Spinka called 
Budhun on that day and informed her that they had replaced 
her with Rushow.  App. 320.  Budhun was not eligible to 
transfer to another position within the hospital because of her 
prior written discipline.  She was told that if her doctor 
released her to work before she found another position at the 
hospital (even though she would have to apply as though she 
were an outsider), she would be terminated.  App. 321.  
Alvarez emailed her on October 6, 2010, asking her to come 
pick up her belongings and turn in her identification badge 
and keys.  App. 328.   
 
Budhun remained on leave, continuing to be eligible 
for fringe benefits, through November 9, 2010.  At the 
expiration of her leave, she did not contact Reading.  Reading 
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considered her to have voluntarily resigned at the end of her 
leave, consistent with its internal leave policy.  App. 159. 
 
Budhun brought suit on November 19, 2010, alleging 
FMLA interference and retaliation claims.  After discovery 
closed, Reading moved for summary judgment on both of 
Budhun’s claims, and the District Court granted the motion.  
It held that Reading was entitled to summary judgment on 
Budhun’s interference claim because “[s]he was never 
medically cleared to return to work and . . . a doctor’s note 
was never provided to defendant.”  App. 16.  It also 
concluded that Budhun was never entitled to the protections 
of the FMLA because she claimed that she was fully capable 
of working at the time that she attempted to return to work on 
August 16, 2010.  Id.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment on Budhun’s retaliation claim because it determined 
that Budhun could not establish a prima facie case as a matter 
of law.  It held that Budhun suffered no adverse employment 
action because Budhun was medically unable to return to 
work at the conclusion of her FMLA leave.  It also concluded 
that Budhun could not establish any temporal nexus between 
her termination and her FMLA leave because “Budhun was 
terminated on November 10, 2010 almost two months after 
she took FMLA.”  App. 18.  Budhun timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over the 
final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review of an order granting 
summary judgment and apply the same standard that the 
District Court applied.  Jakimas v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 
485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate only if there “is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Moore v. 
City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 2006).  The initial 
burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to identify 
evidence that demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986).  If the moving party meets this burden, then it falls to 
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the non-moving party to present evidence on which a jury 
could reasonably find for it.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
 
III. 
 
The FMLA was enacted, in part, to “balance the 
demands of the workplace with the needs of families,” and 
“to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical 
reasons.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1), (2).  It requires certain 
employers to provide their employees with up to twelve 
weeks of leave in the event that the employee has a serious 
medical condition.  Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).  An employer faces 
liability under the Act and its implementing regulations if it 
interferes with a right that the Act guarantees, or if it 
retaliates against an employee for invoking the Act’s 
protections.  Id. § 2615(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
1
  There 
is no dispute that Reading is an employer that was required to 
make FMLA leave available, that Budhun was eligible for 
FMLA leave, or that her hand injury qualified as a serious 
medical condition.  Budhun argues that the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Reading on her FMLA 
interference and retaliation claims was in error.  We agree. 
 
A. 
 
Budhun contends that she adduced enough evidence to 
create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 
Reading interfered with her right to be restored to her position 
on August 16, 2010, the day Spinka told her that she needed 
full use of all ten fingers before she could be reinstated 
despite the fact that there was no essential function of her job 
                                              
1
 All citations to the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 
FMLA regulations that were in effect in 2010, when the facts 
relevant to this case occurred.  See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. 
McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878 (2011) (“Our analysis begins 
with the text of [the regulation] in effect at the time this 
dispute arose.”).  The Department of Labor amended some of 
the FMLA regulations in 2013.  See Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 
8834-01 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
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that she could not perform.  She claims that this action 
interfered with her right to be restored to her position. 
 
The FMLA provides that it “shall be unlawful for any 
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or 
the attempt to exercise, any right” that it guarantees.  29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (noting 
that violations of the regulations are actionable as well).  In 
order to assert an FMLA interference claim, an employee 
“only needs to show that [1] he was entitled to benefits under 
the FMLA and [2] that he was denied them.”  Callison v. City 
of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).
2
  One of the 
rights that it guarantees is “to be restored by the employer to 
the position of employment held by the employee [or an 
equivalent position] when the leave commenced” upon return 
from FMLA leave.  29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).  “An employee 
may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary 
to resolve the circumstance that precipitated the need for 
leave.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.311(c).   
 
1. 
 
 Reading argues that Budhun did not really attempt to 
return to work on August 16, 2010 because shortly after 
                                              
2
 We have more recently phrased this test in a manner similar 
to the way other courts of appeals have.  In Ross v. Gilhuly, 
755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014), we held that in order to 
“make a claim of interference under the FMLA, a plaintiff 
must establish:  (1) he or she was an eligible employee under 
the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an employer subject to the 
FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to FMLA 
leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of his or 
her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was 
denied benefits to which he or she was entitled under the 
FMLA.”  See also Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 
F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 2010) (delineating the elements in a 
similar way).  We note that the first four elements of this 
longer test largely collapse into the first element of the 
Callison formulation because in order to be entitled to 
benefits, an employee must be eligible for FMLA protections 
and leave, work for a covered employer, and provide 
sufficient notice. 
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arriving at BHP, she left and sought a note from Dr. Battista 
requesting leave until September 8, 2010.  The record, 
however, indicates that there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact regarding whether Budhun attempted to invoke her right 
to return to work on that date.  Budhun informed Spinka on 
August 12, 2010 that she intended to return to work on 
Monday, August 16.  In the email where she conveyed this to 
Spinka, she attached a note from her treating physician, Dr. 
Battista, stating that she could return on that date and had “no 
restrictions.”  At the time she entered her place of work on 
August 16, all of the information that she had from her 
treating physician, and all of the information that she had 
provided to Reading, indicated that she intended to return to 
work as of that day, and could do so with “no restrictions.” 
 
Although we have never had occasion to address 
specifically what constitutes invocation of one’s right to 
return to work, Budhun has adduced enough evidence such 
that a reasonable jury could find that she did so here.  Her 
“fitness-for-duty” certification clearly stated that she could 
return to work with “no restrictions.”  Prior to permitting an 
employee to return to work, an employer may request that an 
employee provide such a certification, see id. § 825.312, as 
Reading required of Budhun here.  In it, an employee’s 
healthcare provider must merely certify that the employee is 
able to resume work.  Id. § 825.312(b); see also Brumbalough 
v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 
2005) (interpreting a similar version of the regulation to 
require only a statement that the employee can return to work, 
nothing more).  An employer may require that this 
certification address the employee’s ability to perform the 
essential functions of her job, but only if the employer 
provides a list of essential functions to the employee at the 
time that the employer notices the employee that she is 
eligible for FMLA leave.  29 C.F.R. § 825.312(b).  It is 
undisputed that Reading did not provide Budhun a list of 
essential functions for her to present to Dr. Battista.  Because 
Reading did not provide Budhun with such a list, Dr. 
Battista’s fitness-for-duty certification was based only on the 
description of the job that Budhun would have supplied him.
3
  
                                              
3
 We do not reach the issue of whether an employer may ever 
decline to allow an employee, whose physician has been 
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Budhun stated that Dr. Battista specifically asked her if she 
felt able to type, and she responded that she thought she 
could.   
 
Dr. Battista’s communications were, admittedly, 
somewhat inconsistent.  While he stated in Budhun’s fitness-
for-duty certification and her FMLA leave certification that 
she could return to work on August 16, 2010, he sent a 
separate note on August 16 stating that she should be excused 
from work until September 8.  He did so, however, only after 
Spinka told Budhun that she could not return, questioned Dr. 
Battista’s assessment that she could, and told her that she 
could not return to work until she had full use of all ten 
fingers. 
 
The regulations contemplate just this kind of situation.  
They state that if the employer requires clarification of the 
fitness-for-duty certification, the employer can contact the 
employee’s health care provider (as long as the employee 
gives the employer permission to do so, which Budhun did 
here).  Id. § 825.312(b).  However, the “employer may not 
delay the employee’s return to work while contact with the 
health care provider is being made.”  Id.  Instead of following 
the regulations, Spinka (who is not a doctor) seemingly 
overruled Dr. Battista’s conclusion (albeit reached without an 
employer-provided list of essential job functions) by telling 
Budhun that if she was “truly unrestricted,” she “would have 
full use of all of [her] digits.”  App. 267.  The record is 
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Budhun 
attempted to invoke her right to return to work, and that 
Reading interfered with it when it told Budhun that she could 
not. 
 
Our decision is in accord with the other courts of 
appeals that have considered the question of when an 
employer’s duty to reinstate is triggered.  In Brumbalough, 
the plaintiff obtained a note from her doctor stating that she 
could return to work, but could work up to only forty-five 
hours per week, and could not travel out of town more than 
                                                                                                     
provided a list of essential functions and whose physician 
provided a fitness-for-duty certification, from returning to 
work. 
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once per week.  427 F.3d at 999.  After her employer 
terminated her, she brought suit for interfering with her 
FMLA right to reinstatement.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that “once an employee submits a statement 
from her health care provider which indicates that she may 
return to work, the employer’s duty to reinstate her has been 
triggered under the FMLA.”  Id. at 1004.  
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to 
the same conclusion in James v. Hyatt Regency Chi., 707 
F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2013).  There, the plaintiff presented his 
employer with several fitness-for-duty certifications from his 
doctor, although all of them contained job-related restrictions.  
The court held that the employer’s duty to reinstate the 
plaintiff would have been triggered had the fitness-for-duty 
certifications provided that he could have returned to duty 
without restrictions.  Id. at 780-81.  Because none of the 
doctor’s notes stated that he could work without restrictions, 
no duty was triggered as a matter of law.  The difference 
between James and the instant case is apparent:  Budhun’s 
August 10, 2010 note from Dr. Battista stated that she could 
return with “no restrictions.” 
 
2. 
 
Even if Budhun actually attempted to return to work 
on August 16, 2010, Reading argues that it is still entitled to 
summary judgment because it would have sent her home 
because she could not perform an essential function of her 
job.  The failure to restore an employee to her position at the 
conclusion of her leave does not violate the FMLA if the 
employee remains unable to perform an “essential function” 
of the position.  29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c).  The FMLA 
regulations incorporate guidelines set out in the ADA 
regulations that bear on whether a given function is 
“essential.”  Id. § 825.123(a).  The pertinent ADA regulations 
define “essential functions” to be the “fundamental job 
duties” of the position, and set out a non-exhaustive list of 
evidence that a fact-finder may consider: 
 
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which 
functions are essential; 
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(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before 
advertising or interviewing applicants for the 
job; 
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job 
performing the function; 
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the 
incumbent to perform the function; 
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement; 
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in 
the job; and/or 
(vii) The current work experience of 
incumbents in similar jobs. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), (3).  Importantly, whether a 
particular function is essential “is a factual determination that 
must be made on a case by case basis based upon all relevant 
evidence.”  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 
612 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration and quotation marks omitted) 
(in the ADA context); see also Brumbalough, 427 F.3d at 
1005 (same, in FMLA context); Sanders v. City of Newport, 
657 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). 
 
 The FMLA regulations place the onus on an 
employee’s health care provider — not her employer — to 
certify whether the employee is unable to perform any 
essential function of her job.
4
  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.123(a) 
(“An employee is ‘unable to perform the functions of the 
position’ where the health care provider finds that the 
employee is unable to work at all or is unable to perform any 
one of the essential functions of the employee’s position 
[within the meaning of the ADA regulations].” (emphasis 
added)).  Reading was free to provide Budhun with a list of 
the specific functions that were essential to her job so that Dr. 
                                              
4
 This certification triggers the employer’s duty to reinstate 
only if it provides that the employee can return without 
restriction.  Indeed, we have noted that “[t]he FMLA does not 
require an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation 
to an employee to facilitate his return to the same or 
equivalent position at the conclusion of his medical leave.”  
Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quotation marks omitted).  
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Battista could determine if Budhun could perform them, but it 
did not.  Instead, Spinka unilaterally determined, over email, 
that Budhun could not perform an essential function because 
she had use of only seven fingers. 
 
 Budhun admitted that it was not likely that she could 
type as quickly with seven fingers as she formerly could with 
ten.  But this alone does not mean that she could not perform 
this essential function.  Budhun adduced evidence that there 
was no minimum words per minute requirement in her written 
job description.  App. 311.  Both the other employee who had 
Budhun’s equivalent position, and her supervisor Alvarez, 
employed a “hunt and peck” method to type, utilizing only 
one finger on each hand.  App. 310.  With the use of ten 
fingers, Budhun was able to complete files in about seven 
days, far in advance of BHP’s internal deadlines of sixty to 
ninety days.  Combined with Dr. Battista’s note, Budhun has 
adduced enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that she could, in fact, perform this essential 
function. 
 
3. 
 
 Reading also argues that it could not have interfered 
with Budhun’s right to restoration on August 16, 2010, 
because she was not yet on FMLA leave at that time.  
Although she notified Reading on August 2 that she was 
seeking FMLA leave and completed all of her FMLA 
paperwork on August 16, it was not until August 17 that 
Reading approved it.  Reading contends that Budhun was not 
eligible for FMLA benefits, including restoration, until it 
approved her leave. 
 
 We rejected a similar contention in the retaliation 
context in Erdman v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 582 F.3d 500 
(3d Cir. 2009).  There, the plaintiff informed her employer in 
April that she intended to take FMLA leave in the coming 
July and August.  Id. at 503.  Her employer terminated her in 
May and she brought suit for FMLA retaliation, alleging that 
her employer had terminated her for requesting FMLA leave.  
Nationwide argued that she could not state a retaliation claim 
because she was fired before her leave commenced, and that 
we had previously held that a required element of a prima 
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facie FMLA retaliation case was that an employee “took an 
FMLA leave.”  Id. at 508-09 (quoting Conoshenti v. Pub. 
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
 
 We held that Nationwide’s interpretation of our 
retaliation test was untenable.  So holding would “perversely 
allow a[n] employer to limit an FMLA plaintiff’s theories of 
recovery by preemptively firing her.”  Id. at 509.  
“Accordingly, we interpret[ed] the requirement that an 
employee ‘take’ FMLA leave to connote invocation of FMLA 
rights, not actual commencement of leave.”  Id. 
 
 The same reasoning applies here.  A reading of the 
statute that denies all rights that the FMLA guarantees until 
the time that an employer designates the employee’s leave as 
FMLA would be illogical and unfair.  It would disempower 
employees taking any sort of short term unforeseen leave 
because it would allow employers to deny FMLA rights until 
the employer decided that the FMLA governed the 
employee’s leave.  As we held in Erdman, and consistent with 
Brumbalough and James, it is the time that an employee 
invokes rights under the FMLA that matters, not when his or 
her employer determines whether the employee’s leave is 
covered by the FMLA. 
 
 Reading’s argument also runs counter to the FMLA’s 
regulatory scheme.  The regulations provide that “‘interfering 
with’ the exercise of an employee’s rights would include, for 
example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but 
discouraging an employee from using such leave.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.220(b).  They also prohibit “manipulation by a covered 
employer to avoid responsibilities under [the] FMLA.”  Id.  
This regulation makes clear that an employee’s leave need not 
have been approved by his or her employer in order for an 
employee to invoke rights under the act because an employee 
can state an interference claim even if his or her leave is 
never approved.
5
 
                                              
5
 This interpretation is buttressed by the title of 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220, “Protection for employees who request leave or 
otherwise assert FMLA rights.”  The plain language of the 
title indicates that its protections apply to employees who 
“request” leave, not just those whose leave has been 
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 It appears undisputed that the date on which Budhun 
invoked the protections of the Act was August 2, 2010.  
Spinka acknowledged as much that day, when she emailed 
Budhun FMLA leave forms and asked her to complete them.  
Reading does not argue that Budhun was ineligible for FMLA 
leave on August 2 – in fact, on August 17, Reading approved 
Budhun’s FMLA leave retroactive to August 2 and extending 
to September 8.  Having invoked the FMLA, Budhun was 
eligible to avail herself of the right to return to her position at 
the end of her leave. 
 
4. 
 
 The District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Reading on Budhun’s FMLA interference claim was in error.  
Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether 
Budhun was exercising her right to return to work on August 
16, 2010, and whether she could not perform an essential 
function of her job.   
 
B. 
 
 Budhun next contends that the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Reading on her FMLA retaliation 
claim was in error.  She argues that Reading retaliated against 
her for taking FMLA leave when it impermissibly replaced 
her after her FMLA-protected leave expired.  FMLA 
retaliation claims are rooted in the FMLA regulations.  
Erdman, 582 F.3d at 508.  They prohibit an employer from 
“discriminating or retaliating against an employee or 
prospective employee for having exercised or attempted to 
exercise FMLA rights.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).  FMLA 
retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence are 
governed by the burden-shifting framework established by 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 
302 (3d Cir. 2012).   
                                                                                                     
approved.  Although a title alone is “not controlling,” it can 
be instructive “when it sheds light on some ambiguous word 
or phrase.”  I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308-09 (2001) 
(alterations and quotation marks omitted).   
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 Budhun’s claim is based on circumstantial evidence.  
Thus, to succeed on her claim, it is her burden to establish 
that “(1) she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) 
she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the 
adverse action was causally related to her invocation of 
rights.”  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302; see also Ross, -- F.3d -
-, 2014 WL 2724128, at *6.  Once she establishes a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide 
evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the 
adverse action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If the 
employer meets this “minimal burden,” the employee must 
then point to some evidence that the defendant’s reasons for 
the adverse action are pretextual.  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 
302. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on 
Budhun’s retaliation claim because it held that Budhun could 
not establish the second and third elements of her prima facie 
case.  It stated that because she was unable to return to work 
at the conclusion of her FMLA leave, “her separation from 
employment was not an adverse employment action.”  App. 
17.  It also held that she could not establish any temporal 
nexus between her termination and her FMLA leave because 
“Budhun was terminated on November 10, 2010, almost two 
months after she took FMLA.”  App. 18.  Because it held that 
Budhun could not establish a prima facie case as a matter of 
law, it did not reach Reading’s alleged legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for replacing Budhun or Budhun’s 
pretext arguments. 
 
1. 
 
 The parties contest only the second and third elements 
of Budhun’s prima facie case (it is undisputed that Budhun 
invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave).  An “adverse 
employment action” is an action that “alters the employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, deprives him or her of employment 
opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an 
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employee.”  Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted).
6
  
 
Reading argues that Budhun suffered no adverse 
employment action because she resigned voluntarily on 
November 10, 2010 when she failed to return to work.  It 
contends that Reading continued to provide benefits to 
Budhun through November 9, 2010, the date her non-FMLA 
leave expired, in accordance with its internal policy.  In her 
deposition, Budhun admitted that she was never told that she 
was “terminated” at the time she was told that she was 
replaced by Rushow.  App. 112.  Budhun never submitted a 
“fitness-for-duty” certification prior to her leave expiring on 
November 9, and admits that rather than applying for 
continued leave, she just “gave up.”  App. 110. 
 
But viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
Budhun, a reasonable jury could conclude that Budhun 
suffered an adverse employment action when Reading 
installed Rushow permanently in her position.  Budhun was 
no longer free to return to her previous job.  Alvarez 
expressly told her to turn in her badge and keys, and to pick 
up her personal belongings, which a Reading employee had 
packed into a box.  She was not offered another position at 
the hospital (indeed, she was ineligible to transfer to another 
position).  This certainly altered her “privileges of 
employment,” as she could no longer even enter her place of 
work.  She was expressly told that if her doctor cleared her to 
return to work that she would be formally terminated.  There 
                                              
6
 This Court has not decided whether to apply the less 
restrictive standard for “adverse employment action” 
promulgated in the Title VII context by Burlington Northern 
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  Under 
this more relaxed standard, “a plaintiff must show that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse,” such that the action well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from taking a protected action.  
Id. at 68.  We need not resolve this question today because, as 
the subsequent discussion illustrates, termination, or being 
permanently replaced, meets the more restrictive definition. 
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was no position for her to return to at the hospital.  Such a 
complete elimination of responsibility “significantly altered 
[her] duties and status.”  Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 
243, 256 (3d Cir. 2005).     
 
That Budhun may not have been formally “terminated” 
and continued to receive benefits from Reading does not 
mean that the actions that Reading took short of termination 
were not “adverse employment actions.”  We have never 
required formal termination to be a necessary element of such 
an action.  Even under the Robinson formulation of adverse 
employment action, much less has often sufficed.  See, e.g., 
Caver, 420 F.3d at 256 (holding that transfer to light duty 
with less prestige is considered an adverse employment 
action); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430-31 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that adverse employment actions can 
include suspension without pay, change of work schedule, or 
reassignment).  Budhun has adduced enough evidence such 
that a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered an 
adverse employment action when she was replaced. 
 
2. 
 
 Reading also argues that Budhun has not established a 
causal link between her FMLA leave and any adverse 
employment action.  Whether a causal link exists “must be 
considered with a careful eye to the specific facts and 
circumstances encountered.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers 
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000).  We have been 
reluctant to infer a causal connection based on temporal 
proximity alone.  See Weston, 251 F.3d at 431.  To 
demonstrate a causal connection, a plaintiff generally must 
show “either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity 
between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory 
action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to 
establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  Employers 
“cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in 
employment actions.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 
 
 Reading’s argument with respect to this third prong of 
Budhun’s prima facie case heavily tracks its argument with 
respect to prong two.  It contends that because its separation 
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with Budhun did not occur until November, there was nothing 
unusually suggestive about its timing.  But viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Budhun forecloses this 
argument, because Reading’s decision to replace her in 
September was an adverse employment action.  The record 
demonstrates that Reading decided to replace Budhun before 
her FMLA leave ended, as early as September 15, 2010.  
Rushow was then offered and accepted the position on 
September 25, two days after Budhun’s FMLA leave ended.  
Alvarez and Spinka attempted to contact Budhun regarding 
her replacement starting on September 27, and finally reached 
her on September 29.  We have held that such close temporal 
proximity qualifies as unusually suggestive timing.  See, e.g., 
Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 307 (determining that termination 
less than a week after the plaintiff invoked her right to FMLA 
leave established causation); see also Wierman v. Casey’s 
Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 1000 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
termination several days after the plaintiff took FMLA-
covered leave was sufficient to establish causation); Bryson v. 
Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
an employee who was notified of her termination three 
months after requesting FMLA leave and the day she was 
scheduled to return to work was sufficient to establish a 
causal connection). 
 
3. 
 
The District Court thus erred in concluding that 
Budhun could not establish a prima facie case of FMLA 
retaliation as a matter of law.  Because the District Court did 
not reach the subsequent steps in the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis, we will not either.  The District Court can address 
Reading’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
and Budhun’s evidence of pretext upon remand. 
 
IV. 
 
 Budhun also appeals the District Court’s denial of her 
motion for leave to amend her complaint.  Budhun moved to 
add a claim under the ADA on May 17, 2011.  Her proposed 
amended complaint alleged that Reading regarded her as 
being disabled.  The District Court denied Budhun’s motion 
as futile. 
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 We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion.  Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 
2004).  In the context relevant here, a party may amend its 
pleadings “only with the opposing party’s written consent or 
the court’s leave.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  Although a court 
should grant such leave freely “when justice so requires,” id., 
a court may deny leave to amend when such amendment 
would be futile.  Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Amendment would be futile if the amended 
complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 
F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010).  A complaint fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted where the plaintiff is 
unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007). 
 
 We have little trouble concluding that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.  
The ADA’s definition of “disability” includes “being 
regarded as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(C).
7
  An individual meets this “regarded as” 
requirement if he or she establishes that he or she has been 
subject to an action the ADA prohibits “because of an actual 
or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not 
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.”  Id. § 12102(3)(A).   
 
The statute curtails an individual’s ability to state a 
“regarded as” claim if the impairment is “transitory and 
minor,” which means it has an “actual or expected duration of 
six months or less.”  Id. § 12102(3)(B).  Whether an 
impairment is “transitory and minor” is to be determined 
objectively.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f).  That is to say, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the impairment that the employer 
perceived is an impairment that is objectively transitory and 
                                              
7
 Budhun originally moved to amend her complaint to assert 
both an actual disability claim and a “regarded as” disabled 
claim.  On appeal, she contends that the District Court erred 
only in failing to permit her to add a “regarded as” claim.  See 
Budhun Br. 24. 
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minor.
8
  The ADA regulations list being “transitory and 
minor” as a defense to an ADA claim.  Id.  While ordinarily a 
party may not raise affirmative defenses at the motion to 
dismiss stage, it may do so if the defense is apparent on the 
face of the complaint.  Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 459 
n.16 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
It is abundantly clear that Reading considered Budhun 
to have a broken bone in her hand and nothing more.  The 
proposed amended complaint indicates that Alvarez knew that 
she had a broken finger.  App. 37.  Nowhere in the complaint 
does Budhun allege that Reading thought her injury was 
anything other than a broken fifth metacarpal.  This injury is 
objectively transitory and minor.  Budhun’s proposed 
amended complaint concedes as much because it describes 
the loss of the use of her pinky finger as “temporary.”  Id.  
She specifically alleges that her injury resulted in the “lost 
use of three fingers for approximately two months.”  App. 40.  
As it was evident from the face of her proposed amended 
complaint that Reading regarded her injury as one that is 
objectively transitory and minor, the District Court was well 
within its discretion to deny her motion for leave to amend as 
futile. 
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court as to Budhun’s FMLA interference and 
FMLA retaliation claims.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
order denying Budhun leave to amend her complaint to add 
an ADA claim.  We will remand the action for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                              
8
 The appendix to the implementing regulations provides a 
good illustration of how this defense is intended to operate:  
“For example, an employer who terminates an employee 
whom it believes has bipolar disorder cannot take advantage 
of this exception by asserting that it believed the employee’s 
impairment was transitory and minor, since bipolar disorder is 
not objectively transitory and minor.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630, 
App. 
